62b0d51c02
This prevents a device from being bricked in case when both secure boot & flash encryption are enabled and encryption gets interrupted during first boot. After interruption, all partitions on the device need to be reflashed (including the bootloader). List of changes: * Secure boot key generation and bootloader digest generation logic, implemented inside function esp_secure_boot_permanently_enable(), has been pulled out into new API esp_secure_boot_generate_digest(). The enabling of R/W protection of secure boot key on EFUSE still happens inside esp_secure_boot_permanently_enable() * Now esp_secure_boot_permanently_enable() is called only after flash encryption process completes * esp_secure_boot_generate_digest() is called before flash encryption process starts |
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| .. | ||
| bootloader_clock.c | ||
| bootloader_common.c | ||
| bootloader_flash.c | ||
| bootloader_init.c | ||
| bootloader_random.c | ||
| bootloader_sha.c | ||
| bootloader_utility.c | ||
| esp_image_format.c | ||
| flash_encrypt.c | ||
| flash_partitions.c | ||
| flash_qio_mode.c | ||
| secure_boot.c | ||
| secure_boot_signatures.c | ||