mbedtls: Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing
This is a patch for CVE-2017-18187.
Cherry-picked from 83c9f495ff
Ref. https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/issues/1730
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1 changed files with 2 additions and 2 deletions
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@ -3436,7 +3436,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha
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/*
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* Receive client pre-shared key identity name
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*/
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if( *p + 2 > end )
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if( end - *p < 2 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
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@ -3445,7 +3445,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha
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n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1];
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*p += 2;
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if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || *p + n > end )
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if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || n > (size_t) ( end - *p ) )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
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