2018-08-13 08:37:56 +00:00
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/*
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* WPA/RSN - Shared functions for supplicant and authenticator
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* Copyright (c) 2002-2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*
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* Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of BSD
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* license.
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*
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* See README and COPYING for more details.
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*/
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#ifdef ESP_SUPPLICANT
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#include "utils/includes.h"
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#include "utils/common.h"
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#include "common/defs.h"
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#include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
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#include "common/wpa_common.h"
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#include "rsn_supp/wpa.h"
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#include "crypto/sha1.h"
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#include "crypto/sha256.h"
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#include "crypto/md5.h"
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#define MD5_MAC_LEN 16
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#ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA2
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static int rsn_selector_to_bitfield(const u8 *s)
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{
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE)
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return WPA_CIPHER_NONE;
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40)
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return WPA_CIPHER_WEP40;
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
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return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP)
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return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104)
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return WPA_CIPHER_WEP104;
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#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_128_CMAC)
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return WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC;
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#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
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return 0;
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}
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static int rsn_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(const u8 *s)
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{
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_UNSPEC_802_1X)
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return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X;
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_OVER_802_1X)
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return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK;
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#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X)
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return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X;
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK)
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return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK;
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#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
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#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SHA256)
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return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SHA256;
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256)
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return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256;
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#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
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return 0;
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}
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static int wpa_selector_to_bitfield(const u8 *s)
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{
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE)
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return WPA_CIPHER_NONE;
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40)
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return WPA_CIPHER_WEP40;
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
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return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP)
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return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104)
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return WPA_CIPHER_WEP104;
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return 0;
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}
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static int wpa_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(const u8 *s)
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{
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_UNSPEC_802_1X)
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return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X;
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_OVER_802_1X)
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return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK;
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if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_NONE)
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return WPA_KEY_MGMT_WPA_NONE;
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return 0;
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_NO_WPA2 */
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/**
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* wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn - Parse RSN IE
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* @rsn_ie: Buffer containing RSN IE
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* @rsn_ie_len: RSN IE buffer length (including IE number and length octets)
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* @data: Pointer to structure that will be filled in with parsed data
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* Returns: 0 on success, <0 on failure
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*/
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int wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(const u8 *rsn_ie, size_t rsn_ie_len,
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struct wpa_ie_data *data)
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{
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#ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA2
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const struct rsn_ie_hdr *hdr;
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const u8 *pos;
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int left;
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int i, count;
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memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
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data->proto = WPA_PROTO_RSN;
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data->pairwise_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
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data->group_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
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data->key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X;
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data->capabilities = 0;
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data->pmkid = NULL;
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data->num_pmkid = 0;
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data->mgmt_group_cipher = 0;
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if (rsn_ie_len == 0) {
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/* No RSN IE - fail silently */
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return -1;
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}
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if (rsn_ie_len < sizeof(struct rsn_ie_hdr)) {
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#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie len too short %lu",
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__func__, (unsigned long) rsn_ie_len);
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#endif
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return -1;
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}
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hdr = (const struct rsn_ie_hdr *) rsn_ie;
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if (hdr->elem_id != WLAN_EID_RSN ||
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hdr->len != rsn_ie_len - 2 ||
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WPA_GET_LE16(hdr->version) != RSN_VERSION) {
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#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: malformed ie or unknown version",
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__func__);
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#endif
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return -2;
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}
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pos = (const u8 *) (hdr + 1);
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left = rsn_ie_len - sizeof(*hdr);
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if (left >= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) {
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data->group_cipher = rsn_selector_to_bitfield(pos);
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pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
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left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
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} else if (left > 0) {
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#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie length mismatch, %u too much",
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__func__, left);
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#endif
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return -3;
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}
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if (left >= 2) {
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data->pairwise_cipher = 0;
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count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
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pos += 2;
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left -= 2;
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if (count == 0 || left < count * RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) {
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#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (pairwise), "
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"count %u left %u", __func__, count, left);
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#endif
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return -4;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
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data->pairwise_cipher |= rsn_selector_to_bitfield(pos);
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pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
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left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
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}
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} else if (left == 1) {
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#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for key mgmt)",
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__func__);
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#endif
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return -5;
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}
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if (left >= 2) {
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data->key_mgmt = 0;
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count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
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pos += 2;
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left -= 2;
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if (count == 0 || left < count * RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) {
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#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (key mgmt), "
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"count %u left %u", __func__, count, left);
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#endif
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return -6;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
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data->key_mgmt |= rsn_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(pos);
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pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
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left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
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}
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} else if (left == 1) {
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#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for capabilities)",
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__func__);
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#endif
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return -7;
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}
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if (left >= 2) {
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data->capabilities = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
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pos += 2;
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left -= 2;
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}
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if (left >= 2) {
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data->num_pmkid = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
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pos += 2;
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left -= 2;
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if (left < (int) data->num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN) {
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#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: PMKID underflow "
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"(num_pmkid=%lu left=%d)",
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__func__, (unsigned long) data->num_pmkid,
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left);
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#endif
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data->num_pmkid = 0;
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return -9;
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} else {
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data->pmkid = pos;
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pos += data->num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN;
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left -= data->num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN;
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}
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}
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if (left > 0) {
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#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie has %u trailing bytes - ignored",
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__func__, left);
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#endif
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}
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return 0;
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#else /* CONFIG_NO_WPA2 */
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return -1;
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#endif /* CONFIG_NO_WPA2 */
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}
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int wpa_parse_wpa_ie_wpa(const u8 *wpa_ie, size_t wpa_ie_len,
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struct wpa_ie_data *data)
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{
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const struct wpa_ie_hdr *hdr;
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const u8 *pos;
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int left;
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int i, count;
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memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
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data->proto = WPA_PROTO_WPA;
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data->pairwise_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
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data->group_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
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data->key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X;
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data->capabilities = 0;
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data->pmkid = NULL;
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data->num_pmkid = 0;
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data->mgmt_group_cipher = 0;
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if (wpa_ie_len == 0) {
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/* No WPA IE - fail silently */
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return -1;
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}
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if (wpa_ie_len < sizeof(struct wpa_ie_hdr)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie len too short %lu",
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__func__, (unsigned long) wpa_ie_len);
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return -1;
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}
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hdr = (const struct wpa_ie_hdr *) wpa_ie;
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if (hdr->elem_id != WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC ||
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hdr->len != wpa_ie_len - 2 ||
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RSN_SELECTOR_GET(hdr->oui) != WPA_OUI_TYPE ||
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WPA_GET_LE16(hdr->version) != WPA_VERSION) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: malformed ie or unknown version",
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__func__);
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return -2;
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}
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pos = (const u8 *) (hdr + 1);
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left = wpa_ie_len - sizeof(*hdr);
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if (left >= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN) {
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data->group_cipher = wpa_selector_to_bitfield(pos);
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pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
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left -= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
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} else if (left > 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie length mismatch, %u too much",
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__func__, left);
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return -3;
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}
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if (left >= 2) {
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data->pairwise_cipher = 0;
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count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
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pos += 2;
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left -= 2;
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if (count == 0 || left < count * WPA_SELECTOR_LEN) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (pairwise), "
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"count %u left %u", __func__, count, left);
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return -4;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
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data->pairwise_cipher |= wpa_selector_to_bitfield(pos);
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pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
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left -= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
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}
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} else if (left == 1) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for key mgmt)",
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__func__);
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return -5;
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}
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if (left >= 2) {
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data->key_mgmt = 0;
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count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
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pos += 2;
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left -= 2;
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if (count == 0 || left < count * WPA_SELECTOR_LEN) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (key mgmt), "
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"count %u left %u", __func__, count, left);
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return -6;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
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data->key_mgmt |= wpa_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(pos);
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pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
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left -= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
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}
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} else if (left == 1) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for capabilities)",
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__func__);
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return -7;
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}
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if (left >= 2) {
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data->capabilities = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
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pos += 2;
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|
left -= 2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (left > 0) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie has %u trailing bytes - ignored",
|
|
|
|
__func__, left);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* wpa_eapol_key_mic - Calculate EAPOL-Key MIC
|
|
|
|
* @key: EAPOL-Key Key Confirmation Key (KCK)
|
|
|
|
* @ver: Key descriptor version (WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_*)
|
|
|
|
* @buf: Pointer to the beginning of the EAPOL header (version field)
|
|
|
|
* @len: Length of the EAPOL frame (from EAPOL header to the end of the frame)
|
|
|
|
* @mic: Pointer to the buffer to which the EAPOL-Key MIC is written
|
|
|
|
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Calculate EAPOL-Key MIC for an EAPOL-Key packet. The EAPOL-Key MIC field has
|
|
|
|
* to be cleared (all zeroes) when calling this function.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: 'IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 - 8.5.2 EAPOL-Key frames' has an error in the
|
|
|
|
* description of the Key MIC calculation. It includes packet data from the
|
|
|
|
* beginning of the EAPOL-Key header, not EAPOL header. This incorrect change
|
|
|
|
* happened during final editing of the standard and the correct behavior is
|
|
|
|
* defined in the last draft (IEEE 802.11i/D10).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int wpa_eapol_key_mic(const u8 *key, int ver, const u8 *buf, size_t len,
|
|
|
|
u8 *mic)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ver) {
|
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4:
|
|
|
|
return hmac_md5(key, 16, buf, len, mic);
|
|
|
|
case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES:
|
|
|
|
if (hmac_sha1(key, 16, buf, len, hash))
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(mic, hash, MD5_MAC_LEN);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_compare_rsn_ie(int ft_initial_assoc,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *ie1, size_t ie1len,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *ie2, size_t ie2len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (ie1 == NULL || ie2 == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ie1len == ie2len && memcmp(ie1, ie2, ie1len) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* identical IEs */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
|
|
|
|
if (ft_initial_assoc) {
|
|
|
|
struct wpa_ie_data ie1d, ie2d;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The PMKID-List in RSN IE is different between Beacon/Probe
|
|
|
|
* Response/(Re)Association Request frames and EAPOL-Key
|
|
|
|
* messages in FT initial mobility domain association. Allow
|
|
|
|
* for this, but verify that other parts of the RSN IEs are
|
|
|
|
* identical.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(ie1, ie1len, &ie1d) < 0 ||
|
|
|
|
wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(ie2, ie2len, &ie2d) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (ie1d.proto == ie2d.proto &&
|
|
|
|
ie1d.pairwise_cipher == ie2d.pairwise_cipher &&
|
|
|
|
ie1d.group_cipher == ie2d.group_cipher &&
|
|
|
|
ie1d.key_mgmt == ie2d.key_mgmt &&
|
|
|
|
ie1d.capabilities == ie2d.capabilities &&
|
|
|
|
ie1d.mgmt_group_cipher == ie2d.mgmt_group_cipher)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* wpa_cipher_txt - Convert cipher suite to a text string
|
|
|
|
* @cipher: Cipher suite (WPA_CIPHER_* enum)
|
|
|
|
* Returns: Pointer to a text string of the cipher suite name
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
const char * wpa_cipher_txt(int cipher)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (cipher) {
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_NONE:
|
|
|
|
return "NONE";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40:
|
|
|
|
return "WEP-40";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104:
|
|
|
|
return "WEP-104";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
|
|
|
|
return "TKIP";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP:
|
|
|
|
return "CCMP";
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP | WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
|
|
|
|
return "CCMP+TKIP";
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return "UNKNOWN";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* wpa_pmk_to_ptk - Calculate PTK from PMK, addresses, and nonces
|
|
|
|
* @pmk: Pairwise master key
|
|
|
|
* @pmk_len: Length of PMK
|
|
|
|
* @label: Label to use in derivation
|
|
|
|
* @addr1: AA or SA
|
|
|
|
* @addr2: SA or AA
|
|
|
|
* @nonce1: ANonce or SNonce
|
|
|
|
* @nonce2: SNonce or ANonce
|
|
|
|
* @ptk: Buffer for pairwise transient key
|
|
|
|
* @ptk_len: Length of PTK
|
|
|
|
* @use_sha256: Whether to use SHA256-based KDF
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 - 8.5.1.2 Pairwise key hierarchy
|
|
|
|
* PTK = PRF-X(PMK, "Pairwise key expansion",
|
|
|
|
* Min(AA, SA) || Max(AA, SA) ||
|
|
|
|
* Min(ANonce, SNonce) || Max(ANonce, SNonce))
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* STK = PRF-X(SMK, "Peer key expansion",
|
|
|
|
* Min(MAC_I, MAC_P) || Max(MAC_I, MAC_P) ||
|
|
|
|
* Min(INonce, PNonce) || Max(INonce, PNonce))
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void wpa_pmk_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, const char *label,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *nonce1, const u8 *nonce2,
|
|
|
|
u8 *ptk, size_t ptk_len, int use_sha256)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u8 data[2 * ETH_ALEN + 2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(nonce1, nonce2, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN, nonce1, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN, nonce2,
|
|
|
|
WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN, nonce2, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN, nonce1,
|
|
|
|
WPA_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
|
if (use_sha256) {
|
2019-07-03 12:09:52 +00:00
|
|
|
sha256_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, sizeof(data),
|
2018-08-13 08:37:56 +00:00
|
|
|
ptk, ptk_len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sha1_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, sizeof(data), ptk, ptk_len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation - A1=" MACSTR " A2=" MACSTR"\n",
|
|
|
|
MAC2STR(addr1), MAC2STR(addr2));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "WPA: PMK", pmk, pmk_len);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "WPA: PTK", ptk, ptk_len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* rsn_pmkid - Calculate PMK identifier
|
|
|
|
* @pmk: Pairwise master key
|
|
|
|
* @pmk_len: Length of pmk in bytes
|
|
|
|
* @aa: Authenticator address
|
|
|
|
* @spa: Supplicant address
|
|
|
|
* @pmkid: Buffer for PMKID
|
|
|
|
* @use_sha256: Whether to use SHA256-based KDF
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 - 8.5.1.2 Pairwise key hierarchy
|
|
|
|
* PMKID = HMAC-SHA1-128(PMK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void rsn_pmkid(const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, const u8 *aa, const u8 *spa,
|
|
|
|
u8 *pmkid, int use_sha256)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char title[9];
|
|
|
|
const u8 *addr[3];
|
|
|
|
const size_t len[3] = { 8, ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN };
|
|
|
|
unsigned char hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(title, "PMK Name", sizeof("PMK Name"));
|
|
|
|
addr[0] = (u8 *) title;
|
|
|
|
addr[1] = aa;
|
|
|
|
addr[2] = spa;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
|
|
|
|
if (use_sha256) {
|
2019-07-03 12:09:52 +00:00
|
|
|
hmac_sha256_vector(pmk, pmk_len, 3, addr, len, hash);
|
2018-08-13 08:37:56 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
|
|
|
|
hmac_sha1_vector(pmk, pmk_len, 3, addr, len, hash);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(pmkid, hash, PMKID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_cipher_key_len(int cipher)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (cipher) {
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP:
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP:
|
|
|
|
return 16;
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
|
|
|
|
return 32;
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104:
|
|
|
|
return 13;
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40:
|
|
|
|
return 5;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_cipher_to_alg(int cipher)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (cipher) {
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP:
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_CCMP;
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP:
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_GCMP;
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_TKIP;
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104:
|
|
|
|
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40:
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_WEP;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WPA_ALG_NONE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
u32 wpa_cipher_to_suite(int proto, int cipher)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP)
|
|
|
|
return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ?
|
|
|
|
RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP);
|
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)
|
|
|
|
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP;
|
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP)
|
|
|
|
return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ?
|
|
|
|
RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP);
|
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_WEP104)
|
|
|
|
return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ?
|
|
|
|
RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104 : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104);
|
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_WEP40)
|
|
|
|
return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ?
|
|
|
|
RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40);
|
|
|
|
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_NONE)
|
|
|
|
return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ?
|
|
|
|
RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int rsn_cipher_put_suites(u8 *pos, int ciphers)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int num_suites = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP);
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
num_suites++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP);
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
num_suites++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP);
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
num_suites++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE);
|
|
|
|
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
num_suites++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return num_suites;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int wpa_cipher_put_suites(u8 *pos, int ciphers)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int num_suites = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP);
|
|
|
|
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
num_suites++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP);
|
|
|
|
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
num_suites++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE);
|
|
|
|
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN;
|
|
|
|
num_suites++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return num_suites;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif // ESP_SUPPLICANT
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|